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ments in wage inequality varied a lot by sub-periods: overall wage inequality stayed stable in 1994–1996, then it 
jumped following the 1998 crisis and remained at higher levels for three years. In 2002 the trend reversed again and in 
the course of a single year wage inequality fell back to the level of the mid-1990s. We find that evolution wage inequal-
ity was largely driven by changes in the upper end of the wage distribution. Decomposition of wage inequality by popu-
lation sub-groups shows that inequality has been higher for men, younger and low-educated workers, and rural inhabi-
tants. The structure of inequality did not change much over the period from 1994 to 2003. Demographic variables 
(mainly gender and region) explain the largest proportion of wage dispersion (over 40% of the explained variation and 
15% of total variation). Nearly equivalent is the contribution of firm characteristics with industry affiliation of employer 
playing the leading role. Our results show that returns to education continued to rise at all percentiles of the wage distri-
bution converging at the level of about 8–9% of wage increase for an additional year of schooling. 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
The project investigates changes in wage inequality in Russia (1994–2003). Most of existing studies 
consider wage inequality in the context of overall income inequality treating it as one of the sources 
of income inequality, but not as a separate phenomenon of the labor market. However, often it is the 
context that predetermines policy recommendations. If the problem of wage inequality is studied in 
the context of income inequality, policy recommendations are usually confined to the suggestions to 
compensate for income disparities that emerge from market sources (wages, profits, rents) by social 
transfers. In other words, policy recommendations imply income redistribution that leads to effi-
ciency losses and distortion of work incentives. Putting the problem of wage inequality in the con-
text of labor markets will allow designing less distorting tools of income policy. 
Our results suggest that wage inequality is not a temporary phenomenon. Differences in individual 
earnings are persistent — they are not smoothed over the life cycle, returns to experience are negligi-
bly low. Persistence of high pay differentials has important policy implications. High wage inequality 
and existence of the low pay trap may lead to political instability, growth of informal economy, emer-
gence of under-class and lower long-run rates of economic growth as a result of under-investment into 
human capital. Since low pay is a not transitory experience in the beginning of working career, meas-
ures aimed to reduce labour market poverty should be brought to the top policy agenda. 
Our findings show that inter-industry wage differentials are the most significant contributor to wage 
differentiation with the lowest (conditional) wages in agriculture and budget-funded industries. 
Low-paid workers tend to be employed in the sectors that are traditionally closed from competition. 
Therefore, remedies should be twofold: introduction of more competition and pay reform in the 
budget sector.  
Wage-setting procedures in the Russian public sector are obsolete and have hardly changed since 
the socialist era. In market economies public sector wages are set either through collective bargain-
ing or through special monitoring procedures. The aim of both procedures is to tie public sector 
wages to the wages of "comparable" private sector workers. In Russia wage-setting in the public 
sector is largely a politically driven exercise – the Parliament adopts the minimum wage level and 
the Government sets a progression scale. In real life wages in the Russian public sector depend on 
generosity of local budgets, specific positions of heads of budget organizations in local elites and 
access to non-budget funds. This leads to substantial underpay of many workers in this sector and to 
high variation of wages within the public sector. Pay reform in the public sector should not come to 
mere wage increase (exactly what is currently done — private sector wages rapidly restore the gap). 
It should involve certain deregulation of labor protection legislation to allow employment reduc-
tions in the public sector and measures to increase the efficiency of public services provision.  
Decomposition of wage inequality indicates that — other things being equal — demographic vari-
ables (mainly gender and region) explain large proportion of wage dispersion (over 40% of the ex-
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plained variation and 15% of total variation). These findings suggest that there might be some scope 
for policies targeted on these attributes. Previous research has shown that gender wage gap can be 
mainly attributed to high professional and occupational segregation. This warrants special measures 
that would ensure equal opportunities for men and women at the labour market, equal access to jobs 
in the private sector and equal rights for promotion.  
Regional pay differentials demand for measures aimed on levelling living conditions and lowering 
migration barriers. Housing reform and enhancing availability of mortgages are the key steps of 
such policy.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1990s at the dawn of radical reforms the transition to a market economy was predicted 
to lead to an increase in wage inequality as wages were freed from administrative control. All ex-
planations were related to the need for economic restructuring and rapid resource reallocation. 
Wage differentials were expected to increase in order to stimulate labour reallocation from less to 
more productive sectors. The extent of anticipated inequality growth was related to the scale of ini-
tial distortions that needed to be surmounted. The greater were the distortions under socialist re-
gime, the greater labour mobility they required and so the greater degree of wage inequality was 
necessary to encourage this mobility. In the beginning of restructuring wage differentials were pre-
dicted to be determined by industry- and firm-specific factors, i.e. more profitable firms were likely 
to pay higher wages to attract better workers. Over time, however, pay differentials should go down 
to reflect mostly the differences in workers' human capital. 
Actual trends in wage inequality during the earliest period of Russian transition are now well 
known and documented in literature.1 Many researchers using various sources of data (mainly 
RLMS, VTsIOM, ISITO and other household surveys) have reported sharp increase of earnings 
dispersion soon after the beginning of transition. Basic changes in the Russian wage structure in 
1990–1996 can be summarized as follows:  
1. Wage inequality increased considerably for both men and women during the 1990s. Using ag-
gregate official data, Flemming and Micklewright (1999) report a dramatic jump in all inequal-
ity measures: the Gini coefficient for wages rose from 0.22 in the beginning of the transition pe-
riod to 0.5 in 1996, the 90/10 decile ratio increased from 3.3 in the late 1980s to 10 in 1995. 
Sharp growth of wage differentiation was observed in the early stage of transition (1992–1994), 
since 1994 earnings inequality has remained remarkably stable. These changes in the wage 
structure were complemented with rapid drop of real wages.  
2. Though inequality widened in both tails of the wage distribution, the bottom half of the distribu-
tion expanded more than the top half (Brainerd, 1998). Differences in earnings of low-paid 
workers spread out stronger than those of high-paid workers. 
3. Returns to measured skills (education, occupation) have increased substantially, as well as 
within-group inequality. Brainerd (1998) shows that, from 1991 to 1994, the return to a year of 
education rose from 3.1% to 6.7% for men and from 5.4% to 9.6% for women. In contrast to 
education premium, experience differentials became more compressed, reflecting relative de-
mand shift in favour of younger cohorts with more relevant human capital.  
4. Wages of women declined relative to men's earnings in all percentiles of distribution (Brainerd, 1998). 
                                                 
1 The list of most important contributions includes Brainerd (1998), Flemming and Micklewright (1999), Lehmann and 
Wadsworth (2001). 
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5. Average wages in the private sector grew faster than in the public sector. Industry and regional 
wage differentiation also amplified during transition, but structurally remained very similar to 
the 1980s (Clarke, 2000).  
Trends in the later period are less accurately documented. Fig. 1 depicts the Goskomstat estimates of 
wage inequality in Russia.2 Gini coefficient and the coefficient of funds (CF)3 demonstrated very 
similar developments in 1994–2002. According to the Goskomstat, inequality remained stable in 
1994–1997 with Gini around 0.45. Between 1997 and 1999 the CF jumped by 28% comparing to the 
1997 level. Gini raised by 8% over the same period. Growth of inequality persisted in 2000–2001 
reaching its maximum (Gini = 0.508 and CF = 39.6) in 2001, which was the turning point in the evo-
lution of Russian wage distribution. Goskomstat estimates are not strictly comparable between the 
two periods because of considerable changes in the sampling scheme in 1999 (Goskomstat, 2003). 
Therefore, they should be treated with caution. Changes in the survey design could give rise to spuri-
ous increase in inequality. Moreover, the relevant survey is very restrictive in coverage. It covers only 
large- and medium-size firms and excludes workers at small-size firms, self-employed, household and 
family workers who in 2003 summed up to 40% of total workforce.  
Lehmann and Wadsworth (2001) — denoted L&W (2001) hereafter — use the RLMS data to study 
the effects of wage arrears on the earnings distribution in 1994–1998. Their results are represented 
graphically in Fig. 2. Different lines in Fig. 2 show various techniques used to eliminate the effect 
of wage arrears. In particular, they report that Gini for actually received wages increased from 0.532 
in 1994 to 0.617 in 1996 and then slightly declined in 1998 to 0.605. Using several imputation 
methods to adjust initial measures for wage arrears, they conclude that in the absence of wage ar-
rears Gini estimates would have clustered around 0.42 in 1994, 0.41 in 1996, and 0.44 in 1998. 
Note that adjusted values of Gini coefficients in L&W (2001) are close to the Goskomstat estimates. 
In contradiction with other authors, Kislitsyna (2003) reports a significant decline in wage inequal-
ity after 1996. The peculiarity of her findings may be explained that different from other researchers 
she uses the data on household labour incomes, but not the data on individual wages. Her treatment 
of wage arrears is also not common in the literature. 
Transition to market economy had considerable consequences for wage structures and earnings dis-
tribution in all CEE and CIS countries. Introduction of market reforms led to rise in wage inequality 
                                                 
2 Goskomstat estimates of wage inequality in Russia are based on the Wage Distribution survey which covers all full-
time and part-time workers who have primary job with a firm and had no sick leaves or unpaid administrative leaves 
during the reference month. Wages are the sum of monetary and cash value of in-kind benefits due according to ac-
counting books regardless of whether they were actually paid or not. Wages used in the survey do not include annual 
bonuses, irregular incentive payments, premiums for the launching of new production capacities and food subsidies 
(Goskomstat, 2003b). 
3 The coefficient of funds (CF) is the ratio of the average wage of 10% workers with the highest wages to the average 
wage of 10% workers with the lowest wages. Note that this definition is different from that of the decile ratio (p90/p10), 
which is the ratio of wages at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution over wages at the 10th percentile. By construc-
tion the coefficient of funds is greater than the p90/p10 ratio.  
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and revaluation of returns to education, gender and work experience. Table 1 summarizes some em-
pirical estimates of earnings distribution in transition countries. The existing evidence suggests that 
in the CEE countries (except for Hungary and Romania) transition led to relatively modest expan-
sion of inequality. In most of the CEE countries, the Gini coefficient was in the range between 0.25 
and 0.30 in the early 2000s. Only in Hungary and Romania it exceeded 0.35. On the contrary, in the 
CIS-area most countries experienced tremendous rise in wage inequality. Russia along with Kyr-
gyzstan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan had the largest increases in wage dispersion. The Gini coefficient 
climbed up to 0.50 in these countries. Baltic countries make up an intermediate case between CEE 
and CIS countries.  
In all transition countries growth of wage inequality largely occurred in the early period of transi-
tion and was followed by stabilisation in the later transition period, i.e. with the start of economic 
growth. Returns to education generally rose but those to experience generally fell. Few studies 
could identify an effect of ownership on wages but there is some evidence that wages started to vary 
by firm performance (with implications to rent-sharing). 
Even accounting for greater output decline, sharp growth of earnings dispersion in Russia, which 
now by far exceeds the level observed in advanced western countries and in other Central European 
countries undergoing transition, still remains a big puzzle. 
Several alternative hypotheses (not mutually exclusive) have been offered to explain changes in the 
Russian wage structure. The first explanation attributes the growth of earnings inequality to high 
compression of wages and, thus, low levels of inequality under socialism, when a large proportion 
of wages was determined centrally in accordance with the Uniform Wage Grid. Soviet pay structure 
favoured manual workers, especially employed in mining, heavy industry, and military production, 
and gave much lower reward to activities with high education requirements. Liberalization of wage-
setting regulations moved away administrative distortions and resulted in increasing returns to ob-
served skills (education, occupation) up to their market levels.  
The second explanation stresses the role of monetary factors, i.e. liberalization of prices in 1992 and 
successive burst of inflation which rates varied greatly both across regions and by product groups. 
Moreover, the government failed to index in time wages of workers employed in the budget sector 
leading to the widening of the private-public sector gap.  
The third hypothesis focuses on the growth of the private sector in which wage setting is more 
competitive and, hence, more sensitive to demand-supply factors. Existing models of wage distribu-
tion in transition (Milanovic, 1999; Aghion and Commander, 1999) predict that overall wage ine-
quality should rise for two reasons: (1) workers move from less unequal state sector to more un-
equal private sector; (2) due to greater productivity average wages in the private sector are higher 
than in the state sector.  
The fourth hypothesis concerns possible change in the form of compensation (Brainerd, 1998). 
Firms could choose to convert fringe benefits (housing, medical care, kindergartens, etc.) into cash 
wages. This reflected in growing regional differentials because workers in the northern areas used 
to have more extended 'social packages' under socialism. 
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The fifth explanation relates initial rise in wage inequality to institutional factors (legal and or-
ganisational structure of the enterprise, access to subsidies, ownership) which affect managerial 
willingness to share profits apart from any productivity considerations. Sabirianova Peter (2003) 
compared the relative importance of institutional and market determinants of wage dispersion. 
She concluded that during the early transition period (1992–1998) changes in the wage differen-
tials were mainly explained by institutional factors. During the late transition period (since 1999) 
wage differentials tended to adjust for productivity differences and became more sensitive to 
skill-biased technological change and technology-enhancing FDI. Institutional factors explain 
why earnings inequality may continue to rise even in the lack of intensive restructuring while 
growth of inequality in the later period of transition should be attributed to the acceleration of re-
structuring and labour reallocation.  
The sixth explanation assigns stabilization of wage inequality after 1994 to a widespread practice of 
wage arrears. L&W (2001) estimate that conventional measures of earnings dispersion would be 
20–30 per cent lower in the absence of arrears. 
Additionally, earnings inequality in transition countries was obviously affected by the forces, which 
are believed to drive wage structure in advanced western countries, namely, by skill-biased techno-
logical changes and international trade. 
While some work has been done evaluating each of the above explanations, such work has usually 
focused on assessing each of them in isolation. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate comprehen-
sively the explanatory power of most popular explanations: rise in returns to skills, growth of the 
private sector, and changes in industry composition. 
2. DATA DESCRIPTION AND MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS 
2.1. Sample selection 
The data used in this project come from the 1994–2003 waves of the Russian Longitudinal Monitor-
ing Survey (RLMS) based on the national probability sample. The sample is restricted to individu-
als of working age and thus excludes workers younger than 16 and older than statutory retirement 
age (55 for women, 60 for men). Among the working age population we included only respondents 
who reported employment as their major activity. This restriction excludes self-employed, working 
students and pensioners, women on maternity leave, unemployed and non-employed with casual 
labour incomes, etc. Only primary jobs are considered, incomes from moonlighting and casual work 
are ignored. Then we further restricted the sample to individuals who provided any kind of wage-
related information including overdue wages and value of in-kind payments. Samples for all years 
eliminate workers with monthly wages less than 17600 roubles or greater than 17600×200 roubles 
in November 1994 roubles (17600 roubles was the mandatory wage minimum in November 1994). 
These observations are treated as outliers.  
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
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2.2. Problem of inflation and regional differences in purchasing power 
Choosing a deflator for time series data is an important issue. It is not a trivial task for a country 
with high inflation, disequilibrium price system, continuous price shocks and vast regional dispari-
ties in the costs of living. Surprisingly, high inflation seems to be the easiest problem to handle. It 
can be solved by applying monthly rather than annual price indices. To obtain real values of various 
monetary indicators most of researchers who study wages employ the consumer price indices (CPI) 
as a deflator. We use the CPI as well because better option is not available. The usage of the CPI is 
a potential source of different biases: commodity substitution bias (when some prices increases con-
sumers switch to cheaper goods), new goods bias, quality bias and outlet bias (shifts in shopping 
patterns to lower priced stores) (Hausman, 2002). Existing empirical evidence suggests that biases 
in the Russian CPI are substantial. Bessonov (1998) reported that over the 1992–1996 period due to 
commodity substitution bias alone the official CPI overstated the rise in prices in Russia by 35%. 
Estimates of the contributions of other sources of biases are difficult to isolate. Instead, Gibson 
et al. (2004) attempted to estimate the overall bias in the CPI. With the data from the RLMS, they 
found that on average the CPI overstated inflation by about two percentage points per month during 
1992–1993 and by about one percentage point per month in 1994–2003. In application to wages, 
exaggeration of inflation means that the rise of real wages is likely to be underestimated.4  
Huge differences in costs of living are another problem. If Russian markets were integrated, prices 
of the same goods would vary only because of transportation costs. Gluschenko (2003) showed that 
regional fragmentation of the Russian market increased sharply during the early transition period, 
but this trend reversed in about the end of 1994. Russian markets are still weakly integrated by the 
standards of advanced market economies and there are differences across regions in the speed of 
integration. For example, in 1998 the average value of the consumer basket of 25 basic food prod-
ucts varied from the low of 208 roubles in Ulyanovsk to the high of 1008 roubles in Chukotka with 
the average of 298 roubles for 81 regions. As far as we know, the problem of regional differences in 
living standards has not been adequately handled in empirical studies of wage structures. 
In this study order to correct the data for differences in regional costs of living and inflation we em-
ploy the following two-stage procedure. First, we divided wages by the ratio of regional costs of 
living to the value of the same indicator at the national level. Adjustment is based on the on the 
value of subsistence minimum level for 1994–1998 and on the value of fixed set of consumer goods 
and services for 2000–2003. Second, we deflated regionally adjusted wages using the aggregate 
monthly CPI (November 1994 = 100) quoted by the Goskomstat. Effects of regional price indices 
developments on inequality measures are discussed in more detail the next section. 
The modification of the adjustment procedure was not a voluntary choice, but was forced by the 
changes in the Goskomstat methodology. Until 1999 the subsistence minimum level was calculated 
                                                 
4 BEA (2002) employs two alternative methods to calculate real wages: the final consumption deflator (FCD) based on 
the National Accounts statistics and the retail turnover deflator (RTD) based on trade statistics. Both methods give 
much lower estimates of fall in real wages in the 1990s. For example, in 1999 real wages were equal to 39%, 59% and 
64% of the 1990 level for the CPI, FCD and RTD, respectively. 
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on the basis of methodological recommendations of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security of 
Russia from November 10, 1992 according to the Presidential Decree from March 2, 1992, No 210 
"On the system of minimal consumer budgets". The subsistence minimum is a value estimate of a 
consumer basket with a minimum set of food and non-food goods and services as well as compul-
sory payments and dues. In particular, in the mid-1990s contribution of food expenditures was equal 
to 68.3%; expenditures for non-food goods and services (including housing) comprised 19.1% and 
7.4% of the minimal consumer basket, respectively. The remaining 5.2% of minimal expenditures 
was spent on taxes and other compulsory payments (Ovcharova, 2001). Since 2000 the composition 
of the minimal consumer basket is determined at the regional level according to local legislation 
and procedures are no longer comparable between the regions. The Goskomstat started to calculate 
the value of so-called fixed set of consumer goods and services tailored specifically for using in in-
ter-regional comparisons. It consists of 30 food products, 41 non-food products and 12 kinds of ser-
vices.  
Table 2 shows summary statistics for all observations containing wage-related information. 
2.3. Measurement issues 
Estimates of wage inequality are sensitive to the sample inclusion restrictions (e.g., full-time vs. all 
workers), earnings concept used (hourly vs. monthly), deflator (national vs. regional), handling of 
wage arrears and in-kind payments. Figs 3 and 4 illustrate the dynamics of the Gini coefficient and 
90/10 wage differential under different definitions of earnings.  
All possible earnings definitions can be classified into four groups: 
• Average wages. Average wage is after-tax monthly wage averaged over last 12 months regard-
less of whether wages were paid on time or not. This question was first included into the RLMS 
adult questionnaire in 1998. Thus, time series are available only for 1998–2003, which limits 
their use in analysis. Information about average duration of working week allows computing 
both monthly and hourly rates. From the theoretical point of view, average wages are the best 
measure to use in analysis since they are free from seasonality and are less volatile than actual 
last-month wages. Measures of inequality based on other definitions of earnings are clearly bi-
ased upwards. Figs. 3 and 4 show that trends of inequality in hourly and monthly average wages 
are nearly identical except that hourly wages demonstrate lower inequality.  
• Actual wages. These are after-tax wages actually received by respondents during last 30 days. 
Because of wage arrears, series of actual wages contain many missing and zero observations 
impeding the calculation of conventional inequality measures. Analysis of actual wages makes 
sense only for those not in arrears. However, even for those not in arrears one cannot distin-
guish between contractual wages, bonuses and possible repayments of back wages if these re-
spondents have just got away of wage arrears. Restriction the sample to those not in arrears can 
only be justified if wage arrears are confined to a relatively small proportion of workers and, 
what is more important, if incidence of wage arrears has a random pattern. The existing evi-
dence contradicts both of these conditions. Moreover, sub-sample of those not in arrears is not 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
12
likely to represent well the population; proportion of those in wage arrears in our sample 
amounted to 39% in 1994, 40% in 1995, 59% in 1996, 62% in 1998, 26% in 2000, 22% in 
2001, 20% in 2002 and 16% in 2003. So in the peak of non-payment crisis more than a half of 
the workforce suffered from wage arrears. Excluding the subjected employees would reduce the 
sample size to the useless level. Moreover, wage arrears were not allocated evenly and ran-
domly across workers, firms and regions. They are systematically related to gender, job tenure, 
occupation, wage levels, location, industry affiliation, ownership type, age of the firm and situa-
tion at the local labour market (Earle and Sabirianova, 2002). Therefore, the sample restricted 
to workers not in wage arrears is not representative for the underlying population and actual 
wages are a poor candidate for use in our analysis, especially for the early period of transition. 
• Contractual wages. The RLMS does not contain direct information about contractual wages. In 
this paper, following Earle and Sabirianova (2002), contractual wages are constructed as the 
cumulative debt of firm to the worker divided by the duration of the debt (in number of full 
months). For those not in wage arrears contractual wages coincide with actual wages. In other 
words, contractual wages are the estimates of what wages would be if everyone were paid in 
full and on time.  
L&W (2001) draws attention to three implicit assumptions which lie behind such imputation 
techniques. The first assumption is that workers would not loose their jobs if employers were to 
pay in full. This assumption seems implausible since Russian trade unions are very weak and 
inexperienced in bargaining and workers have virtually no other channels to influence the man-
agement. Since there are no any estimates of elasticity of employment with respect to wage ar-
rears we can only speculate about the potential differences between the 'true' wage distribution 
and the distribution of contractual wages. On the one hand, the use of contractual wages under-
estimates the degree of inequality in comparison with measures based on actual wages. The 
reason is that one imputes higher wages to all workers who are in wage arrears. On the other 
hand, if workers affected by wage arrears are crowded in the low end of the wage distribution 
and they are in risk to loose job if their employers were forced to pay wages in full, then the use 
of contractual wages widens the distribution which would be more compressed in the absence 
of wage arrears. These two effects partly offset each other leading to the estimates, which are 
close to the 'true' parameters of the underlying earnings distribution. Second, imputation as-
sumes that wages are not withheld permanently, rather owed wages will be paid eventually and 
their value will not change much in real terms. Third, contractual wages approach rules out 
welfare consequences of uncertainty about future payments. Owed wages that may be paid or 
not are treated at equal grounds with actually paid money. 
• Total compensation. Apart from wage arrears, many workers suffered from in-kind wage pay-
ments being (often involuntarily) paid with goods produced by their or other firms. Profile of 
in-kind payments is close to the pattern of wage arrears with a peak in 1998. Proportion of those 
affected by in-kind payments was equal to 9% in 1994 and 1995, 14% in 1996, 17% in 1998, 
10% in 2000, 8% in 2001, 7% in 2002 and 5% in 2003. In the late 1990s for 40–45% of them 
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in-kind payments was the only form of received wages; in 1996 at the bottom of barter and non-
payment crisis 54% of them were only paid in-kind. For those who received monetary wages 
and in-kind payments, in-kind payments constituted about 40% of total compensation. Not sur-
prisingly, workers affected by wage arrears were more likely to be paid with goods produced by 
their or other firms and received higher proportion of their wages in-kind.  
Thus, an appropriate definition of earnings should be adjusted for wage arrears and account for the 
fact that in-kind payments have been important part of workers' compensation in Russia during 
transition. Summarizing relative advantages and weaknesses of various wage definitions, we con-
structed our measure of earnings as total compensation equal to the sum of monthly contractual 
wages and the money equivalent of goods paid in-kind. This indicator is the best to reflect potential 
monetary resources available to an individual. In other words, we treat wage arrears as temporarily 
withheld wages that will be eventually paid back to workers. So workers can borrow money against 
future payments of the owed wages and/or sell products received instead of wage payments. 
Figs 3 and 4 show that total compensation closely followed contractual wages during the period un-
der consideration. Hereafter, for the sake of simplicity we call total compensation "wages". 
Concerning the time frame, general trend in literature is to use monthly wages. The reasons for fa-
vouring of monthly wages are both theoretical and practical. We begin with the practical arguments. 
First of all, most of Russian employees are either salaried or are paid on a piece-rate basis, pay-per-
hour contracts are not common in Russia. Hourly wage rates can be only obtained by dividing 
monthly earnings by hours worked. Second, most of Russian workers are employed full-time.5 
Third, the RLMS contains a substantial proportion of non-responses and erroneous answers to the 
question about hours worked. Thus, errors in measuring hours worked may aggravate the errors in 
measuring wages.  
Using monthly wages is not an error-free alternative as well. Many previous studies have showed 
that Russian enterprises responded to transitional output shock not by employment reduction, but 
rather by a combination of real wage decrease and reduction of hours worked. Workforce under-
utilisation varied considerably across firms, regions and industries. Reduction of working week and 
incidence of administrative leaves was not evenly distributed among workers. Therefore, the use of 
monthly wages may mask variation in hours worked and cause biases in the estimates. In particular, 
low-wage employees are more likely to work fewer hours while high wage employees are likely to 
work longer hours.  
From the theoretical perspective, the choice between hourly and monthly wages is also somewhat 
arbitrary. The use of hourly wages is based on the implicit assumption that hours of work are freely 
chosen, so that workers can flexibly substitute work for leisure to enhance their welfare. If this is 
true, then hourly wages would be a better measure of worker's earnings potential. It can also be that 
hourly wages and working hours are "tied" to each other so that wage rates are not independent of 
                                                 
5 For example, in 1995–1998 only about 6.2% of employees worked less than 30 hours per week, including 2.7% work-
ing less than 20 hours (Goskomstat, 2001). 
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working hours and decision is made jointly on hours of work and wages. The third possible case is 
that hours of work are exogenously constrained and labour incomes are not proportional to hours of 
work. In the both of latter cases using monthly wages is an advantages. 
The next choice is between wages of all workers and wages of full-time workers only (defined as 
those who worked at least 140 hours in the previous calendar month). Both trends in Figs 3 and 4 
are nearly parallel. Inequality is higher when measured for the sample of all workers indicating that 
some variation in earnings is due to differences in hours worked. However, we restricted the sample 
to those individuals who reported employment as their primary occupation. Thus, employment is 
likely to be the major source of personal income for both working full- and part-time. Descriptive 
analysis of part-time workers showed that they tend to be female, younger and are more likely to 
have higher education. Such demographic profile suggests that they may be supplementary wage 
earners in the family and/or part-time working schedule may be their voluntary choice resulting 
from rational time allocation decision. Therefore, part-time workers were included into analysis.  
3. MEASURING OVERALL WAGE INEQUALITY 
3.1. Cross-sectional wage inequality  
We begin with descriptive statistics and simple decompositions in order to document the changes 
that occurred in 1994–2003 and uncover the stylized facts about the structure of wages in Russian 
economy.  
A brief methodological remark is in order. The coefficients based on the RLMS data sets are likely 
to underestimate the level of inequality for two reasons: uneven panel attrition and undersampling 
of high-paid workers. Uneven panel attrition reflects the fact that higher paid workers have higher 
propensity to hide their incomes, more frequently refuse to participate in the survey and thus drop 
from the sample. The problem of undersampling is more subtle. The RLMS sample largely relies on 
the house stock that existed in 1994 and does not account for newly built dwellings. The survey 
tries to follow the individuals if they move to new dwellings but many of those who change ad-
dresses actually have left the sample. Since those are mostly high-paid individuals who buy new 
flats and houses original probability sample becomes distorted over time. The table below presents 
the probabilities to drop from the sample by deciles of the wage distribution.6 
Except for 1995, probabilities to drop from the sample are significantly higher for upper deciles. 
Table 3 summarizes changes in inequality for various groups defined by sex, age, education, loca-
tion (rural-urban), and type of employment (part-time or full-time). In spite of dramatic changes in 
real wages, overall wage inequality stayed stable in 1994–1996, then it jumped in the aftermath of 
the 1998 crisis and remained at higher levels for several years. In 2002 the trend reversed again and 
in the course of a single year wage inequality fell back to the level of the mid-1990s. 
                                                 
6 In this specific table the underlying sample is not restricted by age in order to exclude the life-cycle wage effects.  
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Decile position in the wage 
distribution in a previous 
round 
1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average 1995–2003 
1 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.11 
2 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.11 
3 0.07 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.12 
4 0.06 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.11 
5 0.08 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14 
6 0.08 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.14 
7 0.06 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.15 
8 0.09 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.16 
9 0.11 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.17 
10 0.08 0.26 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.21 
Average 0.08 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14 
Our results are generally consistent with arrears-adjusted estimates in L&W (2001) for 1994–1998 
(see Fig. 2). At the same time our inequality estimates are a bit lower than in the official publica-
tions (see Fig. 1). However, the trends are very similar except that according to Goskomstat the 
maximum was observed in 2001 while in our sample inequality peaked in 2000.  
Evolution of overall inequality was largely driven by changes in the upper end of the wage distribu-
tion. This is evident from the indicator GE(2) which responds most strongly to changes in the top of 
the distribution.7 It increased by 49%, from 0.373 in 1994 to 0.558 in 2000. For comparison, GE(0) 
which gives more weight to distances between incomes in the lower tail rose by 16% over the same 
period. Similarly, in 2000–2003 GE(2) declined by 36% while GE(0) — by 18%. The p90/p10 ratio 
was more volatile than p50/p10. The Gini coefficient, which is sensitive to the changes at the mean 
of the distribution, increased only by 10% in 1994–2000 (from 0.417 to 0.457) and then dropped by 
11% in 2000–2003. Thus, changes in relative wages around the mean were relatively minor com-
paring to those among low- and high-paid workers. Focusing on Gini and ignoring other inequality 
                                                 
7 Members of the Generalised Enthropy (GE) class of measures have the general formula as follows: 
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where n is the number of individuals in the sample, yi is the income of individual i, and y is the mean income. The 
value of GE ranges from 0 to ∞, with zero representing an equal distribution and higher values representing higher lev-
els of inequality. The parameter α in the GE class represents the weight given to distances between incomes at different 
parts of the income distribution, and can take any real value. The commonest values of α used are 0,1 and 2. With α = 2 
the GE measure becomes 1/2 the squared coefficient of variation. 
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measures may lead to a deceptive conclusion about stability of the wage distribution over the period 
under consideration. 
Analysis of evolution inequality by sub-periods proves that high-paid workers were the major con-
tributor to reshaping of the distribution. Over the period from 1994 to 1996 GE(2) grew by 6% 
while GE(0) and Gini had virtually no change. This result means that the structure of relative wages 
remained roughly unchanged at the low end of the distribution and widened a bit at the top. Exam-
ining the changes over the period from 1996 to 1998 allows assessing the distribution consequences 
of the 1998 crisis. In particular, over this period GE(2), GE(0) and Gini increased by 29%, 4% and 
3%, respectively. The crisis had dramatic effects for the relative position of high-paid workers ex-
panding the upper part of the distribution. At the low end of the distribution the burden of the crisis 
was distributed more evenly. More precisely, the upper middle part of the distribution suffered most 
sizeable losses while high paid workers at the top of the distribution passed through the crisis rela-
tively well comparing even with low paid workers. In 1998–2000 GE(2) rose by 13%, other  
GE-class measures also increased by about 10%, increase in Gini was 5%. In 2000–2003 the upper 
part of the distribution was narrowing faster than the low end. However this growth was not enough 
to fully compensate larger fall in wages in 1998. 
These developments resemble trends observed in other CEE transition countries, for example, in 
Poland where economic growth was accompanied with compressing of earning inequality (Newell, 
2001; Keane and Prasad, 2002). Note that economic growth and resulting rise in real wages had 
more profound effects of the wage distribution than financial crisis. Moreover, results of economic 
growth affected, albeit unevenly, all percentiles of the distribution, while effects of the financial cri-
sis were concentrated on higher paid workers.  
Fig. 5 presents the Lorenz curves for 1994 and 2002 (the years of the lowest inequality in the sam-
ple) and 2000 (the year of the highest inequality in the sample). They graphically illustrate the 
growth of inequality. The Lorenz curve for 2000 lies strictly below the curves for 1994 and 2002; 
the distance between the curves is larger in the upper part of the distribution.  
Percentile differentials are reported in Table 3 and depicted in Fig. 6. Several conclusions can be 
drawn from the inspection of these alternative inequality measures. First, in all surveys the p50/p10 
ratio was larger than the p90/p50 ratio implying greater wage dispersion among lower paid workers. 
Second, the p50/p10 ratio hardly changed in 1995–2001 after sizeable decline in 1995, while the 
p75/p25 and the p90/p10 has been very volatile implying unstable relative position of workers at the 
upper half of the wage distribution.  
Finally, Fig. 7 graphs the median and the 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentiles of wage distribution 
and helps to understand the changes in the percentile differentials (Fig. 6). For ease of comparison 
wages are indexed to 100 in 1994 for all five series. Before the crisis of 1998 wages of workers in 
all three groups moved close to each other, trends begin to deviate perceptibly only in 2002. Real 
wages declined slightly for the upper part of the distribution in 1995, increased rapidly in all 
ranges in 1996, fell sharply in 1998 and rose steadily afterwards. Growth of real wages in all 
ranges considerably accelerated in 2001–2002. In 2002 growth was greater for wages below the 
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median, but in 2003 it considerably slowed down for this group while for high paid workers the 
growth rates remained the same as in 2001–2002. By 2003 real wages at all points of the distribu-
tion reached the levels observed before the crisis in 1996. These findings support the recent con-
clusion of the World Bank experts that Russian economic growth since 1998 has been pro-poor 
(World Bank, 2005). 
However, we are cautious to conclude that high paid workers became relatively worse off in the 
course of the transition period because the sample under consideration is restricted to employed 
workers. It may be that the least paid workers were crowded out from jobs to unemployment and 
inactivity by their better qualified counterparts while the best of high paid workers could transit to 
self-employment. Moreover, since wage arrears have been mainly allocated among low paid work-
ers their wages are more likely to be imputed wages while in higher deciles wages are most proba-
bly those that were actually received in cash. 
In sum, basic pattern of changes in the wage distribution is robust across all inequality measures. 
Over the whole period the lower half of the distribution has been constantly, albeit slowly, shrink-
ing. In the upper half inequality expanded in 1994–2000 and then started to decline. Note that stud-
ies of wage inequality in the first years of transition (see Brainerd, 1998) have found the opposite 
tendency: the bottom end of the distribution widened more than the top end. Brainerd (1998) has 
attributed an increase in earnings dispersion among low paid workers to the erosion of minimum 
real wage during reforms and to the lack of formal wage bargaining in Russia. Expansion of the up-
per tail of the distribution may reflect sharing the benefits of successful restructuring and/or real 
productivity growth due to whatever reasons (SBTC, trade, favourable supply-demand shifts at the 
labour market, etc.) or may be due to the cancellation of the progressive scale of individual income 
tax. Second, economic growth favoured the lower part of the wage distribution. Third, after the 
burst in 1998–2001 inequality came back to the level of 1994–1996. We cannot exclude the possi-
bility that increase in inequality in 1998–2001 was generated by monetary factors — regional dif-
ferences in adaptation of prices and wages to the shock.  
3.2. "Permanent" inequality  
An increase in cross-sectional inequality can indicate either a rise in the permanent (long-run) wage 
inequality or increase in its transitory component. It may be that differences in individual earnings 
observed at a point in time are smoothed out over the life-cycle. The length of the RLMS panel does 
not allow disentangling the earnings properly into the permanent and transitory wage components. 
Detailed analysis of earnings mobility is beyond the scope of this study; here we only estimate — 
very roughly, using simple and restrictive methods — how important the problem may be. Future 
studies employing more sophisticated empirical techniques are needed to enhance and deepen our 
tentative conclusions as well as to trace the changes in the permanent and transitory components 
over time. 
Our methodology of decomposition is inspired by Gottshalk and Moffitt (1994). First, in order to 
adjust wages for life-cycle earnings growth and eliminate possible year effects, we run — with a 
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pooled data set — a regression of log wages on age, age squared and year dummies (but without a 
constant).8 The further calculations are based on the residuals of this regression. Then we create an 
unbalanced panel restricting it to individuals who had at least 3 wage observations over the 9-year 
period (1994–2003, 8 surveys). Next for each individual we computed the mean of his/her log 
wages over the 9-year period (permanent earnings) and the deviation of his/her earnings from the 
mean in each year (transitory earnings). The variance of permanent log wages is the variance of 
these means across individuals. The variance of transitory log wages is the variance of transitory 
components that was computed separately for each individual and then averaged across individuals. 
Applying this methodology we got permanent variance of log wages equal to 0.502 and transitory 
variance equal to 0.313. The ratio of permanent to transitory variance is equal to 1.6 while in the 
quoted paper by Gottshalk and Moffitt based on US data for 1970–1987 this ratio was reported to 
be around 1.9 implying that transitory component of wages is more significant in Russia.  
Greater relative importance of transitory component is not surprising taking into account economic 
instability and uncertainty of the late 1990s (even after we have controlled for much of it by putting 
time dummies into the regression). On the other hand, higher transitory variance may have positive 
consequences on individual wage prospects suggesting higher opportunities for earnings mobility. 
In Russian high transitory wages are more likely to reflect earnings instability rather than upward 
mobility. Earnings might have been volatile going up and down from year to year. This explanation 
is also consistent with some institutional features of Russian wage-setting mechanism. Base wages 
make up a relatively small fraction of total compensation while the rest of the wage consists of bo-
nuses and other payments conditional on firm's performance and other circumstances.9 Such a 
mechanism ensures flexibility of real wages and their extreme sensitivity to external shocks (Kape-
lyushnikov, 2003).  
Additionally, we estimated conventional inequality measures based on permanent and transitory 
earnings (Table 4). Inequality of permanent wages is still considerable — Gini for permanent wages 
is equal to 0.36. By all presented measures and for all years of the period dispersion of permanent 
wages is higher than that of transitory wages. Inequality in the transitory component was decreasing 
over the 1994–2003 period.  
3.3. Effects of changes in regional purchasing power  
In the previous section we mentioned the problem of inter-regional differences in living standards 
and their instability over time. Recall that to control for the differences in regional purchasing 
power in 1994–1998 we adjusted raw wages using the ratio of the value of regional minimum bas-
ket over the its national average separately for each year. Extremely limited number of products in 
                                                 
8 Gottshalk and Moffitt (1994) control for an experience profile. 
9 According to official estimates, in 2002 base wage (wages paid for piece-rate work and basic salaries) were equal to 
only 45% of total compensation. This fraction varied from the low of 19% in gas industry to the high of 78% in public 
catering (Goskomstat, 2003a). 
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the minimum consumer basket inadequately represents the structure of consumption especially in 
the upper tail of the distribution. For 2000–2003 we use so-called fixed set of goods and services, 
which is extended in comparison with the subsistence minimum basket and has variable weights 
that depend on actual proportions of consumption. 
To estimate the effects of changes in the regional costs of living on wage inequality a very straight-
forward approach was employed. We fixed the differences as they were observed in 1994 and then 
compared actual and fixed-weights' values of inequality measures. The results are shown in Table 5.  
Differences presented in the lower panel of Table 5 suggest that idiosyncratic regional price devel-
opments had only minor impact on wage dispersion. Changes in regional purchasing power had tiny 
disequalising effect in 1995–1996. In 1998 the trend altered and since that time convergence of re-
gional price structures had compressing influence on interregional wage structure. Another conclu-
sion is that switching to another indicator in the living-costs adjustment procedure does not affect 
much the estimates of inequality measures 
4. DECOMPOSING WAGE INEQUALITY 
Inequality decomposition has now become a standard technique of evaluating the wage structure. 
Economists often want to assess the contributions to overall inequality of inequality within and be-
tween different sub-groups of population. Decomposition of wage inequality can give clues to the 
influence of particular characteristics and help to formulate policy measures. Decomposition analy-
sis can also be crucial if inequality is stable over time. Stability in inequality may potentially mask 
changes in the wage structure, for example, if rise in wage dispersion within each sub-group of the 
population is compensated by a decline in inequality between sub-groups. 
Lower panels of Table 3 show that over the whole period wage inequality was higher for men, 
younger and low-educated workers, and rural inhabitants. Figs 8.1–8.5 plot the changes in log real 
wages by percentiles for various group-specific distributions.  
4.1. Changes in real wages by population groups 
Gender. For all years, average (unconditional) wages of men were about 52% higher than those of 
women, but inequality was also higher among males. Moreover, inequality increased greater for 
men in 1994–2001 and then declined faster in 2002–2003. The explanation is that there are more 
workers from the top of the overall wage distribution among men than among women.  
Fig. 8.1 displays important differences in the evolution of male and female distributions. Over the 
whole period the female distribution remained stable; the male distribution somewhat squeezed. 
The p90/p10, Gini and p90/p50 for men were constantly rising in 1995–2000. The trend reversed in 
2001. Intensive widening in the first period occurred only at the tails; the shape of the rest of the 
distribution stayed untouched. After 2000 there was markedly more widening at the low end of the 
male distribution than at the top.  
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Up to 2000 inequality among women grew because of the expansion of the upper half of distribu-
tion that was only partially offset by the narrowing of the lower half. For women, year 2000 was the 
turning point when inequality started to fall. Since 2000 inequality in the upper half has been de-
clining, but the lower half stopped to shrink.  
For the entire period from 1994 to 2003 real wage gains were more evenly distributed across 
women than across men. Women got approx. 20–25% of real wage growth at all percentiles. Low 
paid men gained relative increase comparable to that of women while high paid male workers had 
were virtually no gains. Thus, women gained sizeably over men in the top quartile. The greatest de-
cline in the gender gap occurred in 1994–1996. In 1996–2000 the gap slightly widened. After 1998 
there was little change in the relative position of women, the gap widened only for the top end of 
the distribution. 
Age. Fig. 8.2 shows the evolution of real wages by age group. For the entire period from 1994 to 
2003 essentially in all parts of the distribution older workers (elder than 45) gained less than their 
younger colleagues. Gains of prime-aged workers are close to 20% in all percentiles up to the 90th 
percentile. Younger workers experienced faster wage growth in the bottom quintile, but suffered 
greater losses in the upper tail of the distribution. In terms of relative gains the period of output con-
traction (1994–1998) was mostly unsuccessful for younger workers. Real wages of younger work-
ers on average declined at higher rates during the crisis. Finally, older workers appeared to be less 
competitive in the period of economic growth (1998–2003).  
Education. Fig. 8.3. plots the changes in real wages by major education groups. For the entire pe-
riod university graduates gained more. Differences in gains are particularly striking at the low end 
of the distributions. The changes in educational wage differentials differ considerably across sub-
periods. Both lower-paid and higher-paid university graduates had much slower real wage losses in 
1994–1998 than less skilled workers especially in low deciles. However, during the 1998 crisis uni-
versity graduates lost substantially less than other educational groups. Gains of technical college 
graduates were on average less than those of secondary school graduates for the entire period and in 
all sub-periods except the most recent years.  
Location. Fig. 8.4 shows the evolution of real wages for rural and urban residents. Average (un-
conditional) wages of rural workers were at about 55–60% of the urban wage level. Nonetheless, 
for the entire period the patterns of changes in real wages were very similar for both groups except 
the lowest and the highest deciles. However, there were significant differences in real wage growth 
across the sub-periods. In 1994–1996 rural workers gained substantially over urban workers in the 
upper two thirds of the distribution while relative gains of urban residents were concentrated in the 
lowest percentiles. The 1998 crisis affected higher-paid rural workers stronger than their lower-paid 
colleagues and urban workers. For urban residents misfortunes of the crisis were distributed more 
evenly across percentiles. Since 1998, urban workers have outperformed rural workers in the low 
end and in the middle of distribution while at the tails changes have been of the same magnitude. 
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Sector. Fig. 8.5 compares changes in real wages in the state and private sectors.10 In 1994 average 
(unconditional) earnings in the private sector were 33% higher than in the private sector. By 2000 
this gap increased to 50%. Fig. 8.5a shows private sector employees gained on state sector employ-
ees throughout entire wage distribution with the largest deviations in the upper half. State workers 
experienced slower growth of real wages in all percentiles.  
We find important changes in trends from one sub-period to another. In 1994–1998 growth of real 
wages was slower in the private sector, state sector wages were intensively catching up wages in the 
private sector, especially in the middle of the distribution. Economic growth brought considerably 
higher gains for the private sector workers throughout the distribution, though real wages increased 
in the state sector as well.  
Surprisingly, wage inequality has not been much higher in the private sector; neither was it growing 
more rapidly in the private sector than in the state sector. In fact, fro some years in the early transi-
tion period inequality was slightly higher in the state sector, except for the lowest end of the distri-
bution (see Table 3). In 1994–2000 both sectors had similar patterns of changes in real wages with 
narrowing dispersion in the bottom and increasing inequality in the middle and at the top of the dis-
tribution. Therefore, high-paid and presumably high-skilled workers in the state sector had growing 
incentives to change jobs for the private sector. For lower-paid and presumably low-skilled workers 
there was essentially no change in the sector wage gap. Since 2002 inequality continued to rise in 
the state sector while in the private sector most measures show the narrowing of the distribution due 
to intensive growth of wages in its lower half.  
4.2. Gini decomposition 
Now we turn to more formal techniques of decomposition. Unfortunately, not all measures of ine-
quality presented in Table 3 satisfy a decomposability property. Some measures such as variance 
and measures from the GE-class are easily decomposed into components of within-group inequality 
and between-group inequality: Itotal = Iwithin + Ibetween. Gini coefficient is only decomposable if the 
sub-groups do not overlap in income ranges. If they do overlap then total inequality can only be de-
composed into three components: Itotal = Iwithin + Ibetween + Ioverlap. Lambert and Aronson (1993) show 
that the overlapping term in Gini decomposition is due to intersections of the Lorenz curves. This 
term is the higher the closer together are sub-group means and the larger are the coefficients of 
variation of resulting sub-distributions. Intersections of sub-group Lorenz curves obscure the analy-
sis of inequality between groups: inequalities maybe higher in a certain range of the distribution, but 
lower in some other range.  
Accounting for the popularity of Gini coefficient as an inequality measure we present its decompo-
sition in our empirical analysis. Decomposition of Gini coefficient follows Pyatt (1976).  
Table 6 presents the results of Gini decomposition. Population sub-groups were defined with re-
spect to sex, age, education, occupation, location, region, sector and industry of employment. The 
                                                 
10 Firms are labeled as state if there are NO individuals or private establishments (Russian or foreign) among their owners. 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
22
structure of inequality did not change much over the 1994–2003 period. The results of Gini decom-
position suggest that within-group inequality dominates for location, ownership and gender divi-
sions. The contribution of between-group inequality is high for industry affiliation. For age, educa-
tion and region the unexplained over-lapping component is large.  
The only substantial change in the structure of inequality over the period from 1994 to 2003 is the 
growth of between-group component in the decomposition by type of ownership. Note that in-
crease in the contribution of the regional between-group inequality in 2000–2001 may be spurious 
and caused by the change in methodology of adjustment for the differences in the regional costs 
of living. 
4.3. Variance decomposition 
The shortcoming of a reliance only on the Gini coefficient is that Gini is especially sensitive to the 
changes in the middle of the wage distribution. To balance this disadvantage we present an alterna-
tive decomposition based on the variance that is more responsive to changes in the tails of the dis-
tribution. Given the importance of private sector growth and intensive labour reallocation across 
industries we concentrate on how changes in employment composition affected overall inequality. 
Changes in the total variance can be decomposed into components attributable to changes in the 
composition of employment across sectors or industries versus changes in inequality within sectors 
or industries as follows (Juhn et al., 1993): 
 2 2 2( )t jt jt jt jt t
j j
s s w wσ σ= + −∑ ∑ , (1) 
where t indexes time, 2tσ  is the cross-sectional variance of log real wages, sjt is the employment 
share of industry/sector j, 2jtσ  is the within sector the within-sector variance of wages, wjt is the 
mean wage of sector-j workers, tw is the overall mean wage.
11 Using formula (1), the change in 
variance over time can be decomposed into shifts in within- and between-sector wage differences, 
as well as composition effects. Composition effects rise the variance to the extent that employment 
shifts toward sectors with high/low within-sector variance or toward industries with average wages 
which are different from the overall mean wage. Between-sector component reflects changes in the 
wage differentials between sectors. 
In the 1990s Russia experienced tremendous changes in the industrial structure of employment that 
resulted in substantial decline of relative employment in mining and manufacturing and rapid rise of 
the service employment share. Large shifts in industry employment shares may have contributed to 
the rise in wage inequality. Our estimates using (1) suggest that between-industry inequality ac-
                                                 
11 Note that there are two ways to decompose the change in variance, depending on whether one calculates the within 
sector component of the change in variance using the base period or terminal period sectoral employment shares. We 
use the base period employment shares as weights. 
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counts for 17–18% of total inequality. Table 7 presents the results of decomposition of total change 
in variance into four components for the period 1994–2000 as a whole and for three sub-periods. 
Decomposition used the 24-industry classification based on the OKONKh. For the full period 
changes in relative mean wages across industries are the main driving force of rising inequality. 
70% of overall increase in variance is due to increase in the industry wage differentials, 48% is at-
tributable to increase in variance within industries. Composition effect for within-inequality is neg-
ligibly small. Thus, there were no significant shifts in employment towards industries with lower 
within-industry variance. Composition effect for between-industry inequality is negative implying 
that employment shifted toward the industries with average wages closer to the mean. It seems 
plausible that high wage industries have been more effective in combating labour hoarding and at-
tracting high-productivity workers. Increasing wages in turn lowered demand for labour in such in-
dustries.  
Table 8 presents the decomposition of variance for 1994–2003 based on the distinction between the 
state and private sectors. For the full period such decomposition shows that 186% of overall fall in ine-
quality is due to declining variance within the sectors. This was offset by the rising gap in mean wages 
between the sectors. Within-group composition effect is not large, but positive implying that realloca-
tion of workers from the state sector to the private sector (with larger variance and larger mean wages), 
while being of some importance, was not the main factor of rising wage inequality in Russia. 
5. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF EARNINGS 
5.1. Fields decomposition  
An important drawback of the decomposition presented above is that partitioning the population in 
different ways does not help us to isolate the contribution of each characteristic while fixing the 
others. An alternative approach proposed by Fields (2002) is based on a model that considers simul-
taneously the impact of several given characteristics on earnings. Therefore, it allows us to distin-
guish the contributions of each characteristic.  
The starting point is an ordinary wage equation in which log wages are regressed on a set of ex-
planatory variables. The estimated coefficients will capture the impact of various individual charac-
teristics on wages. The measured dispersion of earnings can be presented in terms of variances and 
covariances of explanatory variables. The contribution of each characteristic is given by: 
 2
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σ σ= = , (2) 
where kS  is the proportion of inequality which is due to the k-th explanatory variable, kβ  is the es-
timated coefficient of the k-th explanatory variable.  
We estimated a separate model for each survey dataset using the following regressors: education 
(measured both as the highest education level attained — 5 categories — and as years of schooling), 
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occupation, potential labour market experience (defined as age-years of schooling-6), experience 
squared, gender, a dummy for full-time employment, size of location, a dummy for employer own-
ership, a dummy for being in wage arrears, firm size, region (at oblast level) and industry dummies 
(for 1994–2000). The results of Fields decomposition are provided in Table 9. They are consistent 
with the results of previous decompositions. Since the wage equation itself explains about 40% of 
variance in earnings, the largest contribution is that of the residual term, i.e. of within-group ine-
quality. The joint explanatory power of regressors has been increasing since 1996 implying the de-
cline of within-group inequality. We classified all the independent variables into four groups: 
demographic, human capital, job and firm characteristics. Note that there is an interruption in the 
series. We do not have the data on industry affiliation for the period after 2000. The results should 
be only considered by sub-periods because part of industry effects can be explained in regressions 
for the later period by regional, gender, education and firm variables which are correlated with in-
dustry affiliation.12 
Among explanatory variables the largest proportion of wage dispersion (about 15–20%) is ex-
plained by demographic variables (gender, marital status, size of location and region). Gender gap 
and regional characteristics are the most important determinants of wage inequality among demo-
graphic characteristics. Size of location was included into equation as a proxy for the diversity of 
options at the local labour market. The joint effect of the location size and regional dummies is 
around 10–15% suggesting high regional polarization in Russia.  
Nearly equivalent is the contribution of firm characteristics with industry affiliation of employer 
playing the leading role. Ownership type is marginally important, but its influence has been steadily 
growing since 1996. Differentiation of firm size for most of the period explained less than 1% of 
inequality. Well renowned from the Soviet times advantages of employment at large-size enter-
prises have been blurred out in the course of transition. Theoretically, several sources of the indus-
try and sector wage differentials are possible: unequal incidence of rent sharing between managers 
and workers across industries and sectors; increased productivity due to restructuring; self-selection 
of workers into certain industries and private firms. The evidence on these issues is limited and we 
do not have firm characteristics in the data set. The RLMS also does not allow distinguishing 
clearly between pure private and privatized firms.  
Human capital characteristics (education, occupation, experience) explain about 6–10% of wage 
variation and their contribution increased sharply after the crisis. Education has been less important 
in explaining inequality than occupation. The impact of education is driven by changes in the higher 
education premium. Experience has been of minor importance but rose a little after 1998.  
Job characteristics (wage arrears and working time) explain about 4–6% of wage dispersion. Con-
tribution of wage arrears is greater in the periods when smaller number of workers were affected 
                                                 
12 To qualify our results for the period before 2001 we estimated regressions for 1994–2000 without industry dummies. 
As expected it led to a considerable increase of within-group inequality (by 6 percentage points on average). Contribu-
tions of region, gender and ownership increased as well (by 1–2 percentage points, respectively). 
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by the problem. When the problem became common and covered majority of workers its effect 
faded. 
5.2. Quantile regression 
In the OLS regression used in the Fields decomposition as much as nearly two-thirds of earnings 
inequality could not be explained by the independent variables. Large error term comes from two 
sources: (1) unobservable characteristics; (2) returns to observable characteristics may differ at 
different points of the distribution. The unobserved determinants of earnings are clearly important 
and deserve investigation. Quantile regression analysis might be able to provide some answers: it 
can be used to compare the earnings function at different points in the conditional wage distribu-
tion (Buchinsky, 1994). Quantiles are defined in terms of the conditional wage distribution, where 
0<q<1 is the quantile (percentage from the bottom) of interest. The regression is obtained by 
minimizing the sum of the absolute deviations of the equation residuals weighted according to q. 
This requires the proportion q of error terms are negative and (1–q) are positive. The error term 
represents measurement error, or chance, or unobserved individual characteristics, or unobserved 
firm or location characteristics that affect the wage. Quantile differences in coefficients on an ex-
planatory variable may therefore reveal a relationship between it and unobserved characteristics. 
Technically quantile regressions are also advantageous because they are less sensitive to outliers 
than the OLS regressions.  
Quantile regressions are estimated for q = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9. The model estimated is of Min-
cer type liner in education. The explanatory variables included are: education (measured in years), 
potential labour market experience, experience squared, gender, a dummy for full-time employ-
ment, a dummy for being rural resident, a dummy for employer ownership, a dummy for being in 
wage arrears, and region dummies. Each quantile regression is estimated for each sample year from 
1994 to 2003. 
Returns to education. The estimated returns to a year of education at the five quantiles are de-
picted in Fig. 9.1. The most striking result is that returns to education at each quantile changes in a 
very similar manner. They demonstrated nearly linear growth until 1998 and flattened later on. Fur-
thermore, the returns to education tended to converge at the level of about 8–9% of wage increase 
for additional year of education. It can be interpreted that unobserved personal characteristics have 
no association with education and different employers place the same value on education. It seems 
to contradict the normal expectation that the coefficient on education should be greater at higher 
quantiles, i.e. more able workers have more schooling. However, the contradiction is solved if look 
at the changes over time. Returns tended to increase somewhat faster at higher quantiles. This trend 
can reflect a growing importance of schooling for employers as a mechanism signalling about indi-
vidual's abilities.  
Year-to-year fluctuations are higher at the extreme quantiles and smaller at the middle quantiles. 
This can be attributed to sampling variation.  
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Figs 9.2 and 9.3 depict evolution of schooling premium in the private and state sector. Returns to 
schooling are very similar in both sectors. At the same time we see that there has been much less 
variation in rates of returns across quantiles of the private sector distribution since 2001. Employers 
in the private sector price skills acquired through education more equally along the wage distribu-
tion. In the state sector returns are higher at lower quantiles. State sector pay systems continue fa-
vouring low-skilled workers. 
Returns to experience. Returns to experience — the derivative of the conditional quantile of log 
wages — are given by β2 + 2×β3×Exp, where β2 and β3 are the coefficients of experience and ex-
perience squared, respectively. Because of non-linearity, returns to experience need to be evalu-
ated at some specified levels of experience. Three points were chosen: 5 years of experience, rep-
resenting new entrants to the labour market; 15 years of experience, representing prime-age 
workers, and 25 years of experience, representing experienced workers. The results are graphed in 
Figs 10.1–10.3. 
A comparison of Figs 10.1–10.3 shows very different returns to the three experience groups. The 
returns are the highest in all years for the new entrants and the smallest — for the most experienced 
workers. For the experienced workers returns have turned to negative since 2000 probably reflect-
ing depreciation of their human capital or employer discrimination towards elder workers. More-
over, over time at each quantile the returns are smoother for more experienced workers than for new 
entrants. Convergence trends for each experience groups are even more pronounced than in the case 
with returns to education. 
There is no any particular ordering of quantile lines for any experience group. For new entrants and 
prime-age workers returns tended to fell up to 1996, then increased in 1998–2000 to start a new pe-
riod of decline in 2001. For experienced workers returns stayed relatively stable in 1995–1998 and 
dropped sharply in 2000. Financial crisis and economic growth brought greater benefits to the new 
entrants and prime-age workers in the upper part of the wage distribution. 
State-private sector differential. Fig. 11 presents the results of quantile regression estimates of the 
state-private sector wage differentials.13 As it is drawn sector wage differential is a penalty for 
working in the state sector.  
At the start of the privatization campaign in 1994 sector wage differentials were remarkably similar 
across quantiles of the wage distribution and equal to about 20%. For later years premiums for tak-
ing jobs in the private sector demonstrated joint and nearly monotonic increase across the quantiles 
until 2000. The private-state gap increased by further 10 percentage points over this period. In 
2001–2002 the gap slightly narrowed but these movements do not appear to constitute a sustained 
trend. 
                                                 
13 Since at the left-hand side of our equation we have log wages, differentials for dummy variables (such as sector) were 
computed as (eD–1)×100% where D is the coefficient of the dummy variable (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980). 
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These results are generally consistent with findings reported in Brainerd (2002). She estimated pri-
vate sector wage differentials by the deciles of the wage distribution in Russia for 1993–1998 and 
reported increasing returns to private sector employment along the wage distribution. Applying her 
hypotheses about the causes of the private sector wage differentials, our results may have the fol-
lowing interpretation. Constant wage premiums in 1994–1998 are in line with the rent-sharing ex-
planation reflecting the well-established fact that wage-setting behaviour in privatised firms hardly 
changed after privatisation. Rising wage premium in 2000 may reflect the start of restructuring and 
the growth of managers' concern about attracting more productive workers by relating wages closer 
to firm and individual performance.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The paper documents the changes in the size of the wage distribution in Russia over the period 
1994–2003. This period does not include the first two years of transition to a market economy, but 
it covers few years of transformational recession (1994–1998), financial crisis in 1998 and the first 
years of economic recovery (2000–2003). In our opinion it is particularly important to analyse what 
happened in Russia because this country is known to have the largest increase in wage inequality in 
the aftermath of the 'big-bang' reforms. 
We do not find any single trend in the evolution of wage inequality over the whole period. Devel-
opments varied a lot by sub-periods. More specifically, overall wage inequality stayed stable in 
1994–1996, then it jumped following the 1998 crisis and remained at higher levels for three years. 
In 2002 the trend reversed again and in the course of a single year wage inequality fell back to the 
level of the mid-1990s. 
We find that evolution wage inequality was largely driven by changes in the upper end of the wage 
distribution. Over the whole period the lower half of the distribution has been constantly, albeit 
slowly, shrinking. In the upper half inequality expanded in 1994–2000 and then started to decline. 
Economic growth favoured the lower part of the wage distribution narrowing the distance between 
the extremes of the distribution.  
We also conducted a detailed examination of the sources of changes in wage inequality. Decompo-
sition of wage inequality by population sub-groups shows that inequality has been higher for men, 
younger and low-educated workers, and rural inhabitants. The structure of inequality did not change 
much over the period from 1994 to 2003. Demographic variables (mainly gender and region) ex-
plain the largest proportion of wage dispersion (over 40% of the explained variation and 15% of 
total variation). Nearly equivalent is the contribution of firm characteristics with industry affiliation 
of employer playing the leading role. Employer ownership is only marginally important, but its ef-
fect has been steadily growing due to increase in the state-private sector gap. Differentiation of firm 
size for most of the period explained less than 1% of inequality. Well renowned from the Soviet 
times advantages of employment at large-size enterprises have been blurred out in the course of 
transition. Human capital characteristics (education, occupation) explain about 8% of total variation 
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(about 20% of explained variation) and their contribution tended to rise in the aftermath of the 1998 
crisis. 
Transition to a market economy triggered substantial shifts in industrial composition of employment 
and industrial wage structure. For the 1994–2000 period changes in relative mean wages across in-
dustries were the main driving force of rising inequality. 70% of overall increase in variance is due 
to increase in the industry wage differentials, 48% is attributable to increase in variance within in-
dustries. Employment shifted toward the industries with average wages closer to the mean. It indi-
cates that high-wage industries were more effective in combating labour hoarding and attracting 
high-productivity workers. Increasing wages in turn lowered demand for labour in such industries. 
Contrary to the initial expectations wage inequality in the state sector was different from that in 
the private sector: both were of a similar level and followed similar patterns of changes. For the 
1994–2003 period within inequality substantially declined in both sectors. This was offset by the 
rising gap in mean wages between the sectors. State workers experienced slower growth of real 
wages in all percentiles. Within-group composition effect is not large, but positive implying that 
reallocation of workers from the state sector to the private sector (with larger variance and larger 
mean wages), while being of some importance, was not the major driving force of wage inequal-
ity in Russia. Similarities in changes in wage inequality within sectors may be an indication of 
problems in the Russian private sector. Privatization has not generated active restructuring or 
changes in wage-setting behaviour at privatized firms. 
Our results show that returns to education continued to rise at all percentiles of the wage distribu-
tion converging at the level of about 8–9% of wage increase for an additional year of schooling. 
This leads to growing importance of schooling in determining wages in the state and the private sec-
tor. Employers in the private sector price skills acquired through education more equally along the 
wage distribution. In the state sector returns are higher at lower quantiles. State sector pay systems 
continue favouring low-skilled workers. 
Our results show that in spite of macroeconomic instability differences in wages were permanent 
rather than temporary — differences in individual earnings are not smoothed over the life cycle. 
Persistence of high pay differentials has important policy implications. Since low pay is a not transi-
tory experience in the beginning of working career rather individuals are trapped in a low pay from 
one period to the next, measures aimed to reduce labour market poverty should be brought to the 
top policy agenda.  
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APPENDICES 
A1. Tables 
Table 1. Changes in wage inequality in transition countries: Gini coefficient  
Country 19
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CEE countries 
Czech 
Republic 0.204  0.212 0.214 0.258 0.260 0.282 0.254 0.259 0.258 0.257 0.270 0.272 0.273
Hungary 0.268 0.293  0.305 0.320 0.324   0.350    0.386  
Poland 0.207  0.239 0.247 0.256 0.281 0.290 0.302 0.300 0.294 0.305    
Slovenia 0.219 0.232 0.273 0.260 0.276 0.275 0.358 0.298 0.307 0.306 0.305 0.306 0.310 0.307
Bulgaria  0.212 0.262  0.251   0.291       
Romania 0.155  0.204  0.226 0.277 0.287 0.305 0.352 0.358 0.372 0.406 0.388 0.391
FYR 
Macedonia  0.223 0.267 0.235 0.272 0.253 0.270 0.250 0.259 0.271 0.277 0.277 0.286 0.282
Baltic countries 
Estonia 0.253        0.336 0.384 0.401 0.376 0.388  
Latvia 0.244  0.247 0.333 0.283 0.325 0.346 0.349 0.336 0.332 0.333 0.337 0.322 0.328
Lithuania 0.260   0.372  0.390 0.374 0.350 0.345 0.357 0.368  0.382 0.390
CIS countries 
Belarus 0.234   0.341 0.399  0.373 0.356 0.354 0.351 0.337 0.337 0.343 0.342
Moldova 0.250   0.411 0.437 0.379 0.390 0.414  0.426 0.441 0.392 0.391 0.426
Russia 0.271 0.269 0.324 0.371 0.461 0.446 0.471 0.483     0.521 0.491
Ukraine 0.244   0.251 0.364   0.413 0.406 0.391 0.427 0.462 0.452 0.418
Armenia 0.258  0.296 0.355 0.366 0.321 0.381     0.486   
Azerbaijan 0.275   0.361  0.428 0.459 0.458 0.462 0.462  0.506 0.501 0.508
Georgia 0.301   0.369 0.400    0.498      
Kyrgyzstan 0.260   0.300 0.445 0.443 0.395 0.428 0.431 0.429 0.466 0.470 0.512 0.490
Turkmenistan 0.255        0.249 0.209 0.265    
Source: TransMONEE — 2004 Database. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for all waves of the RLMS 
 
1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Average age 37.9 37.8 37.8 38.0 37.7 37.5 37.5 37.5 
Sex (% of females) 49.4 48.2 50.3 51.8 51.5 52.1 51.9 51.7 
Location (% of rural) 20.9 19.8 20.6 20.1 22.0 20.6 21.6 21.5 
Incidence of wage arrears (%) 38.5 39.9 58.5 61.5 25.9 21.7 20.2 16.2 
Aver. contractual wage, 
Nov.1994 rbls/1000 209.3 207.3 236.2 158.2 175.0 219.6 238.6 261.0 
Aver. actual wage,  
Nov.1994 rbls/1000 227.9 220.8 257.7 170.4 187.0 229.3 248.6 269.4 
Aver. total compensation, 
Nov.1994 rbls/1000 212.2 210.4 241.0 161.3 177.4 219.3 239.0 261.2 
Average hours worked 161.1 167.5 168.5 164.2 172.6 170.1 170.2 170.7 
Full-time workers (%) 72.8 74.4 72.5 71.8 75.5 77.2 78.3 76.6 
Education 
Primary 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Incomplete secondary 13.8 12.8 11.7 10.5 10.2 10.1 9.4 9.9 
Complete secondary 37.2 39.2 39.3 38.8 40.4 40.7 40.4 40.3 
Technical college 26.2 26.1 26.6 28.3 27.5 26.1 26.9 25.9 
University 21.8 21.2 21.7 21.8 21.5 23.0 23.0 23.5 
Region 
Moscow and St-Petersburg 11.0 9.9 9.8 7.8 5.4 13.7 15.7 14.9 
Northern & North-Western 7.7 7.9 7.6 7.9 7.4 7.2 6.6 6.8 
Central & Central-Black Earth 18.1 18.2 18.9 20.0 20.4 18.5 18.3 18.2 
Volga 17.7 17.4 16.9 18.5 18.5 17.4 18.4 17.8 
Ural 11.8 11.4 11.7 10.3 10.5 9.7 9.7 9.9 
North Caucasian 15.6 16.5 16.4 17.1 17.4 15.6 14.9 16.2 
Western Siberia 9.5 9.2 9.7 8.9 10.0 8.4 7.6 6.7 
Eastern Siberia & Far East 8.7 9.5 8.9 9.6 10.5 9.5 8.8 9.6 
Number of obs. 3478 3166 3045 2982 3251 3675 3952 3984 
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Table 3. Wage distribution in the sample (total compensation, 1994–2003) 
 Average  wage 90/10 90/50 50/10 75/25 GE(–1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) Gini N 
All workers 
1994 212.2 8.6 2.7 3.2 3.1 0.469 0.315 0.294 0.373 0.417 3478 
1995 210.4 8.0 2.6 3.1 3.0 0.445 0.313 0.309 0.432 0.420 3167 
1996 241.0 8.1 2.6 3.1 3.1 0.470 0.315 0.299 0.395 0.418 3048 
1998 161.3 8.3 2.7 3.1 2.9 0.458 0.327 0.331 0.511 0.430 2982 
2000 177.4 8.6 2.9 3.0 3.3 0.509 0.365 0.372 0.558 0.457 3255 
2001 219.3 8.3 2.8 3.0 3.0 0.496 0.356 0.371 0.578 0.450 3680 
2002 239.0 6.9 2.4 2.8 2.7 0.408 0.287 0.281 0.375 0.402 3952 
2003 261.2 7.6 2.5 3.0 2.9 0.443 0.300 0.283 0.358 0.408 3984 
Sex: Males 
1994 256.5 8.5 2.5 3.4 3.2 0.481 0.309 0.279 0.344 0.408 1759 
1995 252.3 7.8 2.4 3.2 2.9 0.447 0.305 0.293 0.391 0.411 1640 
1996 290.2 8.5 2.4 3.6 3.0 0.491 0.312 0.287 0.371 0.409 1514 
1998 196.6 8.6 2.5 3.5 2.9 0.510 0.339 0.335 0.518 0.430 1438 
2000 217.0 9.2 2.7 3.4 3.3 0.543 0.366 0.363 0.530 0.451 1579 
2001 271.3 8.9 2.7 3.3 2.9 0.564 0.371 0.374 0.564 0.453 1765 
2002 288.4 7.2 2.4 3.0 2.7 0.420 0.283 0.271 0.354 0.395 1903 
2003 312.8 7.1 2.3 3.1 2.8 0.436 0.280 0.256 0.311 0.389 1926 
Sex: Females 
1994 167.0 7.1 2.3 3.0 2.8 0.390 0.274 0.258 0.318 0.392 1719 
1995 165.5 7.2 2.5 2.9 2.7 0.374 0.277 0.278 0.402 0.397 1527 
1996 192.4 7.1 2.5 2.9 2.8 0.390 0.276 0.264 0.334 0.395 1534 
1998 128.5 6.9 2.5 2.7 2.7 0.359 0.272 0.271 0.357 0.398 1544 
2000 140.2 7.5 2.9 2.6 2.9 0.413 0.318 0.328 0.467 0.432 1676 
2001 171.4 6.6 2.5 2.7 2.8 0.376 0.290 0.302 0.435 0.412 1915 
2002 193.2 6.2 2.4 2.6 2.5 0.343 0.253 0.247 0.316 0.380 2049 
2003 212.8 6.9 2.5 2.8 2.7 0.391 0.282 0.276 0.363 0.400 2058 
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 Average  wage 90/10 90/50 50/10 75/25 GE(–1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) Gini N 
Education: Primary and incomplete secondary 
1994 184.7 9.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.475 0.345 0.359 0.589 0.443 499 
1995 183.3 8.0 2.8 2.9 3.3 0.481 0.360 0.381 0.612 0.456 414 
1996 199.7 8.1 2.8 2.9 3.0 0.508 0.349 0.344 0.486 0.443 365 
1998 123.5 8.1 2.7 3.0 3.5 0.461 0.341 0.353 0.571 0.440 305 
2000 131.9 9.2 3.1 2.9 3.4 0.506 0.383 0.418 0.747 0.471 316 
2001 157.1 7.7 2.5 3.0 3.4 0.443 0.319 0.309 0.404 0.425 346 
2002 184.2 7.8 2.4 3.2 2.9 0.429 0.295 0.278 0.356 0.403 381 
2003 195.6 8.3 2.6 3.2 3.4 0.406 0.286 0.262 0.305 0.400 408 
Education: Secondary 
1994 200.3 9.3 2.7 3.4 3.2 0.485 0.328 0.309 0.401 0.426 1303 
1995 196.1 8.2 2.6 3.2 3.0 0.453 0.314 0.304 0.410 0.419 1251 
1996 228.7 8.3 2.6 3.2 3.0 0.474 0.325 0.318 0.465 0.425 1199 
1998 145.8 8.8 2.7 3.2 3.2 0.461 0.317 0.294 0.359 0.420 1168 
2000 173.8 9.4 3.1 3.0 3.4 0.549 0.391 0.403 0.625 0.473 1327 
2001 208.6 8.6 2.8 3.1 3.2 0.523 0.375 0.398 0.658 0.462 1497 
2002 217.6 6.9 2.4 2.8 2.8 0.392 0.279 0.267 0.338 0.397 1594 
2003 238.8 8.0 2.5 3.2 3.1 0.451 0.302 0.275 0.324 0.408 1607 
Education: Technical college 
1994 200.1 7.3 2.5 2.9 2.9 0.401 0.272 0.247 0.283 0.389 911 
1995 206.7 6.9 2.7 2.6 2.8 0.414 0.300 0.307 0.456 0.414 828 
1996 234.6 7.3 2.5 2.9 2.8 0.384 0.276 0.264 0.324 0.397 815 
1998 161.1 7.0 2.7 2.6 2.6 0.406 0.318 0.354 0.634 0.431 852 
2000 160.8 7.5 2.8 2.7 3.0 0.429 0.324 0.337 0.509 0.434 905 
2001 200.5 7.0 2.7 2.6 2.7 0.415 0.309 0.318 0.454 0.423 977 
2002 222.2 6.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 0.347 0.250 0.237 0.285 0.377 1061 
2003 250.0 6.7 2.4 2.8 2.8 0.402 0.285 0.280 0.378 0.401 1031 
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 Average  wage 90/10 90/50 50/10 75/25 GE(–1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) Gini N 
Education: University 
1994 265.5 7.4 2.5 3.0 2.9 0.454 0.288 0.257 0.296 0.394 754 
1995 258.0 6.4 2.3 2.7 2.7 0.370 0.267 0.260 0.339 0.390 670 
1996 294.3 8.2 2.4 3.4 2.7 0.485 0.293 0.261 0.308 0.394 666 
1998 207.4 6.5 2.5 2.6 2.7 0.395 0.291 0.301 0.461 0.408 654 
2000 225.8 7.5 2.6 2.9 2.9 0.414 0.304 0.304 0.410 0.419 707 
2001 283.9 7.0 2.6 2.7 2.8 0.440 0.325 0.343 0.513 0.434 853 
2002 318.8 6.2 2.6 2.4 2.5 0.373 0.275 0.280 0.384 0.398 909 
2003 340.3 6.1 2.4 2.5 2.5 0.358 0.256 0.249 0.316 0.381 938 
Age: 16–30 
1994 207.1 9.9 2.8 3.5 3.2 0.511 0.342 0.320 0.403 0.436 868 
1995 199.6 8.6 2.8 3.1 2.9 0.465 0.333 0.338 0.497 0.435 813 
1996 235.3 8.5 2.8 3.1 3.4 0.491 0.331 0.317 0.425 0.429 785 
1998 148.1 8.4 2.8 3.0 3.2 0.438 0.320 0.318 0.442 0.429 795 
2000 159.3 7.7 2.8 2.8 3.3 0.478 0.359 0.382 0.614 0.456 956 
2001 209.8 8.8 2.9 3.0 2.9 0.500 0.359 0.370 0.552 0.453 1109 
2002 226.9 6.5 2.4 2.7 2.5 0.393 0.280 0.277 0.370 0.398 1233 
2003 248.6 7.2 2.3 3.1 2.9 0.412 0.278 0.255 0.303 0.391 1232 
Age: 30–45 
1994 216.6 8.6 2.7 3.2 3.3 0.481 0.319 0.298 0.386 0.419 1759 
1995 212.7 7.8 2.6 3.0 3.0 0.446 0.306 0.293 0.382 0.413 1576 
1996 242.0 8.3 2.6 3.2 3.0 0.474 0.319 0.305 0.417 0.420 1532 
1998 165.2 8.6 2.7 3.2 3.0 0.475 0.336 0.347 0.580 0.434 1442 
2000 190.7 8.7 2.9 3.0 3.4 0.538 0.378 0.379 0.556 0.464 1453 
2001 231.3 8.3 2.7 3.0 3.1 0.524 0.370 0.385 0.611 0.458 1606 
2002 251.6 7.4 2.5 3.0 2.8 0.432 0.299 0.289 0.383 0.409 1655 
2003 270.5 7.9 2.6 3.0 3.1 0.460 0.312 0.296 0.382 0.417 1664 
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 Average  wage 90/10 90/50 50/10 75/25 GE(–1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) Gini N 
Age: 45+ 
1994 208.3 7.6 2.5 3.1 2.9 0.401 0.276 0.257 0.313 0.392 851 
1995 217.0 7.4 2.6 2.9 2.9 0.416 0.305 0.313 0.469 0.416 778 
1996 244.9 7.2 2.5 2.9 3.0 0.437 0.289 0.266 0.319 0.399 731 
1998 168.0 7.9 2.6 3.1 2.6 0.437 0.311 0.310 0.428 0.419 745 
2000 175.1 8.5 2.7 3.2 3.1 0.479 0.339 0.338 0.486 0.437 846 
2001 210.3 7.4 2.6 2.9 2.8 0.442 0.324 0.339 0.532 0.430 965 
2002 233.5 6.7 2.4 2.8 2.6 0.384 0.274 0.269 0.359 0.393 1064 
2003 261.2 7.3 2.4 3.1 2.8 0.448 0.303 0.289 0.372 0.410 1088 
Location: Urban 
1994 233.6 7.7 2.5 3.0 2.8 0.432 0.287 0.267 0.334 0.397 2750 
1995 227.7 6.6 2.4 2.7 2.7 0.402 0.289 0.289 0.403 0.405 2541 
1996 262.7 7.2 2.4 3.0 2.8 0.417 0.286 0.275 0.362 0.400 2418 
1998 177.4 7.5 2.5 3.0 2.8 0.423 0.304 0.309 0.472 0.415 2383 
2000 193.3 7.8 2.7 2.9 3.1 0.452 0.328 0.332 0.483 0.433 2538 
2001 242.3 7.3 2.6 2.8 2.8 0.450 0.328 0.344 0.527 0.433 2922 
2002 262.5 6.3 2.3 2.7 2.5 0.359 0.260 0.259 0.344 0.385 3098 
2003 287.0 6.7 2.4 2.8 2.6 0.381 0.266 0.254 0.320 0.386 3129 
Location: Rural 
1994 131.3 6.8 2.8 2.5 2.9 0.387 0.302 0.310 0.429 0.422 728 
1995 140.3 8.7 3.0 2.9 3.1 0.431 0.326 0.328 0.455 0.436 626 
1996 157.6 8.8 3.0 2.9 3.3 0.457 0.331 0.325 0.431 0.436 630 
1998 97.5 6.8 2.4 2.8 2.8 0.365 0.292 0.311 0.475 0.414 599 
2000 121.1 7.8 3.4 2.3 3.0 0.516 0.419 0.495 0.940 0.499 717 
2001 130.9 7.1 2.8 2.6 2.8 0.408 0.329 0.367 0.628 0.441 758 
2002 153.8 7.7 2.7 2.9 2.7 0.377 0.284 0.280 0.354 0.407 854 
2003 166.8 8.0 2.9 2.8 3.0 0.431 0.320 0.319 0.423 0.431 855 
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 Average  wage 90/10 90/50 50/10 75/25 GE(–1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) Gini N 
Employer ownership: State 
1994 195.2 8.5 2.7 3.1 3.0 0.452 0.309 0.290 0.360 0.416 2559 
1995 184.0 7.7 2.5 3.0 3.0 0.410 0.290 0.275 0.347 0.404 2040 
1996 214.0 7.9 2.5 3.1 3.1 0.432 0.296 0.274 0.327 0.407 1901 
1998 140.2 7.8 2.6 2.9 2.9 0.411 0.303 0.304 0.441 0.416 1805 
2000 144.0 7.8 2.8 2.8 3.2 0.457 0.344 0.361 0.578 0.446 1820 
2001 174.7 7.1 2.5 2.8 2.9 0.432 0.327 0.355 0.600 0.434 1836 
2002 197.0 6.7 2.3 2.9 2.6 0.359 0.260 0.252 0.326 0.383 1905 
2003 205.1 7.5 2.5 3.0 2.8 0.388 0.272 0.254 0.306 0.390 1794 
Employer ownership: Private 
1994 259.8 8.2 2.4 3.4 2.9 0.462 0.297 0.275 0.354 0.400 919 
1995 258.2 7.1 2.6 2.8 2.8 0.448 0.319 0.322 0.460 0.426 1127
1996 285.8 7.8 2.5 3.1 2.9 0.492 0.320 0.307 0.423 0.418 1147
1998 193.8 7.9 2.5 3.1 2.9 0.484 0.332 0.334 0.520 0.430 1177
2000 219.8 8.1 2.7 3.0 3.1 0.482 0.342 0.341 0.476 0.441 1435
2001 263.8 7.8 2.6 3.0 2.9 0.490 0.342 0.346 0.507 0.439 1844
2002 278.2 7.1 2.4 2.9 2.8 0.411 0.285 0.276 0.362 0.399 2047
2003 307.1 7.1 2.4 3.0 2.8 0.427 0.286 0.269 0.335 0.398 2190
Notes: In 1994 rubles/1000. 
Table 4. Inequality of permanent and transitory components 
 90/10 90/50 50/10 75/25 GE(–1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) Gini 
Permanent wages 
1994–2003 6.2 2.4 2.5 2.7 0.323 0.251 0.250 0.317 0.384 
Transitory wages 
1994 3.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 0.198 0.151 0.148 0.175 0.293 
1995 3.5 1.8 1.9 1.9 0.163 0.138 0.141 0.174 0.283 
1996 3.4 1.8 2.0 1.8 0.159 0.127 0.125 0.148 0.268 
1998 3.2 1.7 1.9 1.7 0.145 0.118 0.116 0.137 0.257 
2000 3.2 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.137 0.117 0.121 0.159 0.259 
2001 3.0 1.7 1.8 1.7 0.126 0.107 0.108 0.126 0.248 
2002 2.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 0.112 0.094 0.093 0.105 0.231 
2003 3.0 1.7 1.8 1.7 0.132 0.105 0.100 0.109 0.244 
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Table 5. Effects of changes in regional costs of living 
 Average  wage 90/10 90/50 50/10 75/25 GE(–1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) Gini 
Fixed costs of living 
1994 212.2 8.6 2.7 3.2 3.1 0.469 0.315 0.294 0.373 0.417 
1995 205.8 8.0 2.6 3.1 3.0 0.453 0.318 0.314 0.437 0.424 
1996 226.9 7.9 2.6 3.1 3.0 0.467 0.318 0.305 0.409 0.421 
1998 148.3 7.9 2.6 3.0 2.9 0.427 0.313 0.319 0.492 0.422 
2000 175.7 8.6 2.8 3.0 3.2 0.491 0.354 0.360 0.534 0.450 
2001 221.7 8.5 2.7 3.1 3.0 0.503 0.352 0.356 0.525 0.447 
2002 248.0 7.6 2.5 3.0 2.8 0.428 0.297 0.289 0.386 0.409 
2003 273.4 8.1 2.6 3.1 3.0 0.481 0.319 0.300 0.385 0.420 
Difference (fixed weights values minus actual values) 
1994 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1995 –4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 
1996 –14.1 –0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.003 0.003 0.006 0.013 0.004 
1998 –13.0 –0.4 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 –0.031 –0.014 –0.012 –0.019 –0.008 
2000 –1.8 –0.1 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.017 –0.011 –0.012 –0.024 –0.006 
2001 2.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.007 –0.003 –0.014 –0.053 –0.003 
2002 8.9 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.020 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.006 
2003 12.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.038 0.019 0.018 0.027 0.012 
Table 6. Gini decomposition 
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002**) 
Variable*) 
Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % 
Between 0.105 25 0.101 24 0.106 25 0.108 24 0.099 25 
Overlap 0.110 26 0.115 28 0.118 27 0.128 28 0.110 27 
Sex 
Within 0.201 48 0.201 48 0.207 48 0.220 48 0.193 48 
Between 0.080 19 0.072 17 0.079 18 0.070 15 0.077 19 
Overlap 0.052 12 0.060 14 0.049 11 0.083 18 0.053 13 
Location  
(rural/urban) 
Within 0.285 68 0.286 68 0.301 70 0.303 66 0.272 68 
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1994 1996 1998 2000 2002**) 
Variable*) 
Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % 
Between 0.077 18 0.083 20 0.078 18 0.110 24 0.084 21 
Overlap 0.285 68 0.280 67 0.293 68 0.285 62 0.263 65 
Region 
Within 0.054 13 0.054 13 0.059 14 0.062 14 0.055 14 
Between 0.011 3 0.008 2 0.024 6 0.040 9 0.024 6 
Overlap 0.247 59 0.252 60 0.247 57 0.253 55 0.238 59 
Age 
Within 0.159 38 0.158 38 0.159 37 0.164 36 0.140 35 
Between 0.062 15 0.061 15 0.086 20 0.081 18 0.089 22 
Overlap 0.243 58 0.238 57 0.222 52 0.240 53 0.199 50 
Education 
Within 0.113 27 0.118 28 0.122 28 0.136 30 0.115 29 
Between 0.111 27 0.092 22 0.109 25 0.117 26 0.107 27 
Overlap 0.241 58 0.262 63 0.260 60 0.276 60 0.241 60 
Occupation 
Within 0.066 16 0.064 15 0.062 14 0.064 14 0.055 14 
Between 0.173 41 0.188 45 0.184 43 0.198 43    
Overlap 0.220 53 0.208 50 0.224 52 0.235 51    
Industry 
Within 0.023 6 0.022 5 0.023 5 0.024 5    
Between 0.059 14 0.070 17 0.079 18 0.105 23 0.085 21 
Overlap 0.117 28 0.137 33 0.138 32 0.132 29 0.120 30 
Ownership 
(state/private) 
Within 0.241 58 0.211 50 0.213 50 0.219 48 0.198 49 
*) Region — 8 categories, age — 3 categories, education — 5 categories, occupation — 10 categories, industry — 24 categories.  
**) Data on industry affiliation are not available for 2001–2003. 
Table 7. Effects of industrial shifts on changes in wage inequality 
Within industry Between industry 
Years Total change in variance Change in variance Composition effect Change in wages Composition effect 
1994–2000 0.037 0.018 0.001 0.026 –0.007 
1994–1996 –0.008 –0.012 0.001 0.001 0.002 
1996–1998 –0.012 –0.011 0.004 0.003 –0.008 
1998–2000 0.058 0.034 0.002 0.028 –0.007 
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Table 8. Effects of sectoral shifts on changes in wage inequality 
Within sector Between sector 
Years Total change in variance 
Change in variance Composition effect Change in wages Composition effect 
1994–2003 –0.036 –0.067 0.010 0.025 –0.004 
1994–1996 –0.008 –0.013 0.005 –0.002 0.002 
1996–1998 –0.012 –0.018 0.001 0.004 0.000 
1998–2000 0.058 0.033 0.001 0.022 0.001 
2000–2003 –0.073 –0.070 0.004 –0.004 –0.002 
Table 9. Fields decomposition, % 
 1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Sex 4.5 4.5 4.3 3.5 4.0 4.6 5.6 4.9 
Marital status 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 
Size of location 6.2 11.5 6.7 2.9 2.4 9.6 18.1 25.1 
Region 3.8 –1.5 4.7 8.9 10.1 6.0 –5.5 –12.3 
Demographic characteristics 14.7 14.8 15.7 15.5 16.6 20.3 18.5 17.9 
Education 1.9 2.4 2.1 3.2 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.3 
Occupation 4.5 3.3 3.8 4.9 4.3 4.0 4.8 5.6 
Experience 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Human capital characteristics 6.7 6.1 5.9 8.4 8.3 8.0 9.2 10.4 
Wage arrears 4.0 3.7 2.3 2.0 3.5 2.6 2.9 3.5 
Full/part time 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.6 
Job characteristics 5.3 4.9 3.4 3.8 5.1 4.1 4.3 5.1 
Industry 10.4 10.4 11.5 11.3 12.1    
Ownership 0.9 1.4 0.7 1.2 2.4 4.2 3.2 4.5 
Firm size 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.9 
Firm characteristics 12.1 12.3 12.3 12.6 15.0 5.0 4.2 5.4 
Seasonality  –0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.5 
Residual 61.4 61.8 62.7 59.4 55.1 61.8 63.6 60.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Fig. 1. Goskomstat estimates of wage inequality. From establishment-based survey of wage distribu-
tion. The survey was not carried in 1998. Source: Goskomstat (1999, 2001, 2003) "Trud i zaniatost' v 
Rossii"; Goskomstat (2004) "Sotsial'noe polozhenie I uroven' zhizni naseleniya Rossii"  
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Fig. 2. Inequality measures adjusted for wage arrears — based on L&W (2001). Actual values are not available 
for the 90/10 ratio because of wage arrears 
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Fig. 3. Dynamics of Gini coefficient under different definitions of earnings 
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Fig. 4. Dynamics of the 90/10 ratio under different definitions of earnings 
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Fig. 5. Lorenz curve 
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Fig. 6. Percentile ratios 
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Fig. 8.1. Change in log real monthly wages by percentile: males vs. females. (–) — Males, ( ) — Females 
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Fig. 8.2. Change in log real monthly wages by percentile: age. (–) — 16–30, (+) — 30–45, ( ) — 45+ 
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Fig. 8.3. Change in log real monthly wages by percentile: education. (–) — Secondary school, (+) — College, ( ) — University 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
44
a) 1994-2003
Percentile
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 95
.1
.2
.3
.4
b) 1994-1998
Percentile
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 95
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
c) 1998-2000
Percentile
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 95
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
d) 2000-2003
Percentile
5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 95
.2
.4
.6
 
Fig. 8.4. Change in log real monthly wages by percentile: location. (–) — Rural, ( ) — Urban 
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Fig. 8.5. Change in log real monthly wages by percentile: employer ownership. (–) — State, ( ) — Private 
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Fig. 9.1. Returns to a year of education by quantiles 
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Fig. 9.2. Returns to a year of education by quantiles: private sector 
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Fig. 9.3. Returns to a year of education by quantiles: state sector 
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Fig. 10.1. Returns to a year of experience by quantiles (experience = 5 years) 
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Fig. 10.2. Returns to a year of experience by quantiles (experience = 15 years) 
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Fig. 10.3. Returns to a year of experience by quantiles (experience=25 years) 
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Fig. 11. State sector wage differential by quantiles 
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